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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64824
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Hildenbrand, Andreas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-11 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-11T13:39:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-11T13:39:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64824 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms, especially when it comes to oligopoly theory. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals firms! This experimental approach is not in line with modern industrial organization, according to which a firm's market behavior is also determined by its organizational structure. In this paper, a Stackelberg experiment is considered in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as organizational decision making or implementing an organizational structure is more effective in generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by teams. Teams are organized according to Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) contractual view of the firm. I find that teams' quantity choices are more in line with the assumption of profit maximization than individuals' choices. Compared to individuals, teams appear to be less inequality averse. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKiel | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2012-53 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C92 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | industrial organization | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Stackelberg game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | individual behaviour | en |
dc.subject.keyword | team behaviour | en |
dc.subject.keyword | framing | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experimental economics | en |
dc.title | Is a "firm" a firm? A Stackelberg experiment | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 727377787 | en |
dc.rights.license | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201253 | en |
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