Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64727
Authors: 
Hu, Yingyao
McAdams, David
Shum, Matthew
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
cemmap working paper CWP15/09
Abstract: 
We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement error in Hu and Schennach (2008). Unlike Krasnokutskaya (2009), we do not require that equilibrium bids scale with the unobserved heterogeneity. Our approach accommodates a wide variety of applications, including settings in which there is an unobserved reserve price, an unobserved cost of bidding, or an unobserved number of bidders, as well as those in which the econometrician fails to observe some factor with a non-multiplicative effect on bidder values.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
263.69 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.