Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64548 
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dc.contributor.authorFonseca, Miguel A.en
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-27-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:59:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:59:37Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-066-6en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64548-
dc.description.abstractWe conduct experiments testing the relationship between excess capacity and pricing in repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth duopolies and triopolies. We systematically vary the experimental markets between low excess capacity (suggesting monopoly) and no capacity constraints (suggesting perfect competition). Controlling for the number of firms, higher production capacity leads to lower prices. However, the decline in prices as industry capacity rises is less pronounced than predicted by Nash equilibrium, and a model of myopic price adjustments has greater predictive power. With higher capacities, Edgeworth-cycle behavior becomes less pronounced, causing lower prices. Evidence for tacit collusion is limited and restricted to low-capacity duopolies.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorfen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x67en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC90en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen
dc.subject.keywordexcess capacityen
dc.subject.keywordEdgeworth cyclesen
dc.titleExcess capacity and pricing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets: Experimental evidence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn726566926en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:67en

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