Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64539 
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dc.contributor.authorYan, Huibinen
dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Danielen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-22-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:41:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:41:59Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64539-
dc.description.abstractEach of n >= 1 identical buyers (and m >= 1 identical sellers) wants to buy (sell) a single unit of an indivisible good. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m > n and among the sellers when m < n; the long side gets nothing. We test this core conjecture in the lab with n + m = 3 or 5 randomly rematched traders and minimal imbalances (m = n +- 1) in three market institutions. In the standard continuous double auction, the surplus indeed goes overwhelmingly towards the short side. The DA-Chat institution allows traders to have cheap talk prior to the double auction, while the DA-Barg institution allows the long siders to negotiate enforceable profit sharing agreements while trading. Despite frequent attempts to collude and occasional large deviations from the core prediction, we find that successful collusion is infrequent in both new institutions. A disproportionate fraction of the successful collusions are accompanied by appeals to fairness.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of California, Economics Department |cSanta Cruz, CAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x640en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcoreen
dc.subject.keywordmarketen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.stwCoreen
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen
dc.subject.stwUnteilbarkeiten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAn experiment on the core-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn587692707en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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