Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
|dc.description.abstract||This paper presents results from a randomized field experiment to test for the importance of limited commitment (due to incomplete contract enforceability) in explaining intra-household risk sharing arrangements in Kenya. The experiment followed 142 daily income earners and their spouses for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (US $2) income shock (equivalent to about 1.5 days income for men and 1 week's income for women). This paper has 2 main results. First, since the experimental payments are random, they allow for a direct test of allocative Pareto efficiency. I reject efficiency, as male private goods expenditures are sensitive to the receipt of the payment. Second, the experiment varied the level of intra-household correlation in the experimental payments between couples. I find that women send bigger transfers to their husbands when shocks are independent or negatively correlated, a result consistent with the presence of limited commitment. I find no difference in transfers for men, likely because the shocks were too small to cause the limited commitment constraint to bind for them.||en_US|
|dc.publisher|||aUniv. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics |cSanta Cruz, Calif.||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aWorking Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department |x639||en_US|
|dc.title||Limited insurance within the household: Evidence from a field experiment in Kenya||en_US|
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.