Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64506
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dc.contributor.authorHenwood, Keithen_US
dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Danielen_US
dc.contributor.authorOprea, Ryanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:41:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:41:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64506-
dc.description.abstractHuman players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These findings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics |cSanta Cruz, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department |x658en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary dynamicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordHawk-Dove gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordcontinuous time gameen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwKonflikten_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleSeparating the hawks from the dovesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn616908881en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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