Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64422 
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dc.contributor.authorGander, James P.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:38:46Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:38:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64422-
dc.description.abstractThe note focuses on the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) in Nash's product formula solution to bargaining and why the formula works. Two simple examples from duopoly and bilateral monopoly are used to demonstrate that the MRS's for both players are implicitly in the contract curve and the product formula. They are equal in the former by design. They become equal in the latter in equilibrium. The self-referential logic is evident. The bargaining model or system is self-contained and circular and is analogous to the proposition given by x = F(x).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Utah, Department of Economics |cSalt Lake City, UTen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2008-10en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelC65en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordBargainingen
dc.subject.keywordPareto Optimumen
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Referential Logicen
dc.titleNash's bargaining formula revisited: A note on self-referential logic-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn57263837Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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