Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/64107 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 10-14
Verlag: 
University of California, Santa Cruz Institute for International Economics (SCIIE), Santa Cruz, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a model comparing the optimal degree of asset class diversification abroad by a central bank and a sovereign wealth fund. We show that if the central bank manages its foreign asset holdings in order to meet balance of payments needs, particularly in reducing the probability of sudden stops in foreign capital inflows, it will place a high weight on holding safer foreign assets. In contrast, if the sovereign wealth fund, acting on behalf of the Treasury, maximizes the expected utility of a representative domestic agent, it will opt for relatively greater holding of more risky foreign assets. We also show how the diversification differences between the strategies of the bank and SWF is affected by the government's delegation of responsibilities and by various parameters of the economy, such as the volatility of equity returns and the total amount of public foreign assets available for management.
Schlagwörter: 
sovereign wealth funds
capital flows
foreign exchange reserves
financial markets
governance
JEL: 
E52
E58
F15
F30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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