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dc.contributor.authorKoskela, Erkkien_US
dc.contributor.authorOllikainen, Markkuen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the socially optimal forest taxation in the rotation framework when the government has a binding tax revenue requirement. In the Faustmann model the optimal design of taxation consists of non-distortionary taxes, such as site productivity tax, site value tax or profit tax. A combination of distortionary unit (or yield) tax and timber tax can also be used to collect the tax revenue in a nondistortionary way. In the Hartman model with forest amenity services as a public good, the optimal design consists of a non-distortionary tax and a Pigouvian tax, which adjusts the private rotation age to the socially optimal one. Now only the site productivity tax is non-distortionary, while unit, yield, timber, site value and profit taxes generally serve as corrective Pigouvian taxes. Finally, in the absence of a non-distortionary tax, if the marginal valuation of amenity services is non-decreasing with the age of forest stand, a combination of unit (or yield) and timber taxes can be used to both tax revenue collection and Pigouvian correction.en_US
dc.publisher|aThe Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) |cHelsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aETLA Discussion Papers, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA) |x815en_US
dc.subject.keywordrotation ageen_US
dc.subject.keywordforest amenitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal forest taxationen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwInternalisierung externer Effekteen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.titleOptimal forest taxation under private and social amenity valuationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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