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dc.contributor.authorChu, Ke-youngen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-21T09:31:14Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-21T09:31:14Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.isbn929190662Xen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63370-
dc.description.abstractFindings of cross-cultural psychology suggest that different approaches to rule enforcement have cultural roots. Individualist societies have established a rule of law, in which rules prevail; collectivist societies have a rule of man, which allows discretionary rule enforcement, which, in turn, is recognized as an obstacle to sustained increases in productive long-term investment in developing countries. This paper presents a model that offers a unified framework to explain rule enforcement as social optimization processes in both individualist and collectivist societies and, on this basis, highlights the essential differences between a rule of law and a rule man (i.e., between rules and discretion). The paper uses this framework to show that cross-country variations in rule enforcement are explained to a considerable extent by cultural values. The paper then uses the framework to show how the imported multi-stage rule enforcement institutions based on separation of powers in vertically-oriented collectivist societies, unlike in the individualist societies from which they originate, might not ensure as low a degree of discretion as intended. Finally, the paper uses these results to explore practical ideas that would help collectivist societies benefit from rule enforcement with low discretion.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Research Paper |x2004/65en
dc.subject.jelK00en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordrule of lawen
dc.subject.keywordrule of manen
dc.subject.keywordcollectivismen
dc.subject.keyworddiscretionen
dc.subject.keywordenforcementen
dc.subject.keywordindividualismen
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordrulesen
dc.subject.stwRechtsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungen
dc.titleA model of a rule of law and a rule of man: Implications for the design of institutions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn477336655en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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