Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63198
Authors: 
Hoel, Michael
Shapiro, Perry
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2000,16
Abstract: 
It is a widely held view that efficient environmental policies regulating transboundary pollution will be adopted only if there is interjurisdictional coordination. Efficient policies can be adopted as a result of interstate treaties or mandated by a central authority. However, if the policies of states are chosen to maximize the same function of own citizen welfare, and if individuals migrate freely between states, constrained-efficient environmental regulatory policies are a non-cooperative equilibrium. The policies are constrained-efficient in equilibrium, the policy choices are the same as those found by maximizing the social welfare function subject to a policy feasibility constraint.
Subjects: 
Transboundary pollution
Population mobility
Federalism
JEL: 
D6
H7
Q20
R23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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