Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63156
Authors: 
Mehlum, Halvor
Moene, Karl
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2008,06
Abstract: 
In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three propositions of our paper are contrary to the implications of static conflict models. They follow from incorporating positional dynamics into the standard static approach. Such positional dynamics are relevant for competition in battlefields, politics, and market places.
Subjects: 
Contests
political stability
war
incumbent advantage
JEL: 
C73
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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