Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63155 
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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen
dc.contributor.authorNilssen, Toreen
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Larsen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:16:04Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:16:04Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/63155-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a model where TV channels transmit advertising, and viewers dislike such commercials. We find that the less differentiated the TV channels’ programs are, the lower is the amount of advertising in equilibrium. Relative to the social optimum, there is underprovision of advertising if TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes. In such a situation, a merger between TV channels may lead to more advertising and thus improve welfare. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a larger amount of advertising than a private TV channel. It may actually have advertising even in cases where it is wasteful per se.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2005,15en
dc.subject.jelL82en
dc.subject.jelM37en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordTelevision industryen
dc.subject.keywordAdvertisingen
dc.subject.keywordPublic policyen
dc.subject.keywordMixed oligopolyen
dc.subject.stwFernsehwerbungen
dc.subject.stwFernsehanstalten
dc.subject.stwMedienverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAdvertising on TV: Under- or overprovision?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn487852133en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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