Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63152
Authors: 
Hoel, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2008,04
Abstract: 
During the last couple of decades, there has been a large literature discussing how the properties of emission taxes are affected by the existence of distortionary taxes. Most of this literature ignores distributional aspects of environmental taxes and other types of environmental policy instruments. The present paper considers a very simple model with heterogeneous households, differing in income earning ability. The tax system i s not necessarily fully optimal. Instead, a tax function is assumed the be exogenously given, but the parameters of this tax function are opmtimally chosen. The rule for the second-best opmtimal environmental tax is derived and compared with the Pigovian rule. The results derived in the present paper are related to the results from the literature on public goods provision under distortionary taxes.
Subjects: 
Environmental taxes
public goods
distortionary taxation
JEL: 
H23
H41
Q58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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