Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63110
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2000,41
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider an economy where most of the health care is publicly provided, and where there is waiting time for several types of treatments. Private health care without waiting time is an option for the patients in the public health queue. We show the effects of a tax (positive or negative) on private health care, and derive the socially optimal tax/subsidy. Finally, we discuss how the size of the tax might affect the political support for a high quality public health system.
Schlagwörter: 
Private health care
public health care
health queues
JEL: 
I11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
215.01 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.