Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63095
Authors: 
Asheim, Geir B.
Perea, Andrés
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2000,38
Abstract: 
The concepts of sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability are defined in an epistemic model by means of lexicographic probabilities. These are non-equilibrium analogs to sequential and quasi-perfect equilibrium, for which epistemic characterizations are provided. The defined rationalizability concepts are shown to imply backward induction in generic perfect information games, but they do not yield forward induction. The relationship between various concepts are shown and illustrated.
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
416.45 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.