Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63091 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2002,35
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a new explanation for why firms pay for general training in a competitive labor market. If firms are unable to tailor individual wages to ability, for informational or institutional reasons, they will pay for general training in order to attract better quality workers. The market provision of training may well exceed the first best level. Our explanation relies on wage compression within skill categories, while imperfect competition based explanations for firm subsidised general training rely on wage compression across skill categories.
Schlagwörter: 
competitive labor market
general training
JEL: 
D82
J31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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