Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63064 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2004,29
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes, exemplified with environmental pollution. When in power, a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view to influencing the policy of future, possibly different, governments. We demonstrate that a ‘brown’ government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes, as quotas establish property rights that are costly to reverse. Conversely, a ‘green’ government prefers to regulate by taxes, in order to limit the incentives of future ‘brown’ governments to ease regulations. Strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences (making ‘green’ governments ‘greener’ and ‘brown’ governments ‘browner’) compared to when such strategic considerations were not an issue.
Schlagwörter: 
regulation
political economy
effluent taxes
tradable quotas
property rights
commitment
environmental management
JEL: 
D81
H23
L51
Q28
Q38
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
420.15 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.