Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63008 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2000,08
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
We justify the application to extensive games of the concept of ‘fully permissible sets’, which corresponds to choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The extensive games considered illustrate how our concept yields support to forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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