Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63002
Authors: 
Asheim, Geir B.
Wenche Emblem, Anne
Nilssen, Tore
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2002,13
Abstract: 
We study a health-insurance market where individuals are o.ered coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income. Individuals vary in their level of innate ability. If there is private information about the probability of illness and an individual’s innate ability is su.ciently low, we find that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.
Subjects: 
health insurance
adverse selection
deductibles
JEL: 
D82
I11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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