Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62997 
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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrineen
dc.contributor.authorWestskog, Hegeen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:12:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:12:41Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62997-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze how restricting intertemporal trading by prohibiting borrowing of emission permits affects the ability of a dominant agent to exploit its market power, and the consequences this has for the cost-effectiveness of implementing an emissions target. We show that the monopolist could take advantage of the constraint on borrowing by distributing the sale of permits ineffectively across periods, and moreover that this inefficiency is influenced by the way permits are initially allocated between agents. A cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods can be achieved by an appropriate distribution of the total endowments of permits over time for each agent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2005,04en
dc.subject.jelD92en
dc.subject.jelH74en
dc.subject.jelQ52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpollution permitsen
dc.subject.keywordintertemporal tradingen
dc.subject.keywordmarket poweren
dc.subject.keywordborrowing constrainten
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten
dc.subject.stwIntertemporale Allokationen
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen
dc.titleDominant agent and intertemporal emissions trading-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn481090479en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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