Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62974
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dc.contributor.authorNyborg, Karineen_US
dc.contributor.authorHowarth, Richard B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kjell Arneen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:10:55Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:10:55Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62974-
dc.description.abstract“Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for public good provision. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This can produce multiple equilibria, with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved through permanent or temporary taxes, or through advertising that temporarily influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo |cOsloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo |x2003,31en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD11en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMoral motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmultiple Nash equilibriaen_US
dc.subject.keywordgreen taxesen_US
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktdifferenzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltzeichenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleGreen consumers and public policy: On socially contingent moral motivationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn373612524en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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