Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62974 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2003,31
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
“Green” consumers appear to accept individual responsibility for public good provision. The propensity to take such responsibility may depend on beliefs about others’ behavior, even for consumers motivated by internalized moral norms, not by social sanctions. This can produce multiple equilibria, with either high or low demand for “green” products. Permanent increases in green consumption may be achieved through permanent or temporary taxes, or through advertising that temporarily influences beliefs about others’ behavior or about external effects. If a tax is interpreted as taking responsibility away from the individual, however, taxes can reduce the influence of moral motivation.
Schlagwörter: 
Moral motivation
multiple Nash equilibria
green taxes
JEL: 
C72
D11
H41
Q20
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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