Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62948
Authors: 
Holden, Steinar
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2001,10
Abstract: 
How will the commitment to price stability affect labour market rigidities in the European Monetary Union? I explore a model where firms choose between fixed wage contracts (where the employer cannot lay off the worker, and the wage can only be changed by mutual consent), or contracts where employment is at will, so that either party may terminate employment (with strong similarities to temporary jobs). A fixed wage contract provides better incentives for investment and training, while employment at will facilitates efficient mobility. Inflation erodes the real value of a fixed contract wage over time, and badly matched workers are more likely to quit for other jobs. Disinflation has opposing effects on labour market rigidity: fixed wage contracts become more rigid in real terms, but fewer firms will choose fixed wage contracts.
Subjects: 
Nominal wage rigidity
inflation
employment contracts
training
EMU
JEL: 
J3
E31
E52
K31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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