Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62895 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 572
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics, London
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a particular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica, 1997) of an extension of the Nash axioms and solution to domains including non-convex problems, as well as a complete characterizations of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality, Covariance with positive affine transformations, and Independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Schlagwörter: 
Bargaining, Non-convex problems, Nash bargaining solution
JEL: 
C72
D44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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