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dc.contributor.authorGoyal, Sanjeeven
dc.contributor.authorVega-Redondo, Fernandoen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T13:01:00Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T13:01:00Z-
dc.date.issued2003-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62882-
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pair-wise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network formation, however, has powerful effects on individual behavior: if costs of forming links are below a certain threshold then players coordinate on the risk-dominant action, while if costs are above this threshold then they coordinate on the efficient action. These findings are robust to a variety of modifications in the link formation process. For example, it may be posited that, in order for a link to materialize, the link proposal must be two-sided (i.e. put forward by both agents); or that, in case of a unilateral proposal, the link may be refused by the other party (if, say, the latter's net payoff is negative); or that a pair of agents can play the game even if connected only through indirect links.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary University of London, Department of Economics |cLondonen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x481en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelD6en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNetworks, Links, Coordination games, Equilibrium selection, Risk dominance, Efficiencyen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwNetzwerken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwKoordinationen
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.titleNetwork formation and social coordination-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn377035793en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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