Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62835
Authors: 
Lombardi, Michele
Mariotti, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London 608
Abstract: 
An uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and strict relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered bargaining solutions.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Tournaments
Uncovered set
Non-convex problems
JEL: 
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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