Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62830 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 502
Verlag: 
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics, London
Zusammenfassung: 
We demonstrate that one should not expect convergence of the proposals to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium offer in standard ultimatum games. First, imposing strict experimental control of the behavior of the receiving players and focusing on the behavior of the proposers, we show experimentally that proposers do not learn to make the expected-payoff-maximizing offer. Second, considering a range of learning theories (from optimal to boundedly rational), we explain that this is an inherent feature of the learning task faced by the proposers, and we provide some insights into the actual learning behavior of the experimental subjects. This explanation for the lack of convergence to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in ultimatum games complements most alternative explanations.
Schlagwörter: 
Ultimatum game, Non-equilibrium behavior, Laboratory experiment, Multi-armed bandit, Optimal learning, Gittins index, Bounded rationality
JEL: 
C72
C91
D81
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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