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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bosch-Domènech, Antoni | en |
dc.contributor.author | Vriend, Nicolaas J. | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-20T12:59:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-20T12:59:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely related small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well as experimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordination devices. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aQueen Mary University of London, Department of Economics |cLondon | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aWorking Paper |x621 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C91 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Coordination game | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Focal point | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Nash equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Equilibrium selection | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Coordination device | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Koordination | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nash-Gleichgewicht | en |
dc.subject.stw | Test | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 558918360 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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