Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62817
Authors: 
Bosch-Domènech, Antoni
Vriend, Nicolaas J.
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London 621
Abstract: 
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalent equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium and is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players' choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely related small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well as experimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordination devices.
Subjects: 
Coordination game
Focal point
Nash equilibrium
Equilibrium selection
Coordination device
JEL: 
C72
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
524.42 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.