Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62787
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dc.contributor.authorPancs, Romansen_US
dc.contributor.authorVriend, Nicolaas J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-20T12:58:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-20T12:58:39Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62787-
dc.description.abstractSchelling [1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978] presented a microeconomic model showing how an integrated city could unravel to a rather segregated city, notwithstanding relatively mild assumptions concerning the individual agents' preferences, i.e., no agent preferring the resulting segregation. We examine the robustness of Schelling's model, focusing in particular on its driving force: the individual preferences. We show that even if all individual agents have a strict preference for perfect integration, best-response dynamics will lead to segregation. What is more, we argue that the one-dimensional and two-dimensional versions of Schelling's spatial proximity model are in fact two qualitatively very different models of segregation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aQueen Mary, Univ. of London, Dep. of Economics |cLondonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper, Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London |x487en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNeighborhood segregation, Myopic Nash Equilibria, Best-response dynamics, Markov chain, Limit-behavioren_US
dc.subject.stwWohnstandorten_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMarkovscher Prozessen_US
dc.subject.stwSegregationen_US
dc.titleSchelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisiteden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn377037621en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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