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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Grimm, Veronika | en |
dc.contributor.author | Riedel, Frank | en |
dc.contributor.author | Wolfstetter, Elmar | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-09-18T13:49:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-09-18T13:49:59Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2001 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049639 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62770 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aHumboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSFB 373 Discussion Paper |x2001,31 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D45 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | multi-unit auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | spectrum auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | telecommunications | en |
dc.subject.keyword | industrial organization | en |
dc.subject.keyword | game theory | en |
dc.title | Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 724885277 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200131 | en |
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