Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62770
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dc.contributor.authorGrimm, Veronikaen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiedel, Franken_US
dc.contributor.authorWolfstetter, Elmaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-18T13:49:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-18T13:49:59Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049639en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62770-
dc.description.abstractThe second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aHumboldt-Universität |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes |x2001,31en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD45en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmulti-unit auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordspectrum auctionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordtelecommunicationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordindustrial organizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordgame theoryen_US
dc.titleLow price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn724885277en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:sfb373:200131-

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