Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62769
Authors: 
Hansen, Jan
Schmidt, Carsten
Strobel, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,61
Abstract: 
Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioral model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 99 state elections.
Subjects: 
prognosis
political stock markets
decisive vote illusion
manipulation
JEL: 
C93
D4
G1
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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