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Avrahami, Judith
Güth, Werner
Kareev, Yaakov
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Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2001,35
Predating predators requires at least three specimen to which we refer as players 1, 2, and 3. Player 1 has simply to guess nature when trying to find food. Player 2 is hunting player 1 in the hope that 1 is well-fed but must also avoid being hunted by player 3. One major motivation is to test three benchmark solutions (uniformly perfect, impulse balance and payoff balance equilibrium) in such a complex strategic setting. In the experiment three participants play repeatedly the game (partner design) which allows to test whether certain types of behavior are just initial inclinations or stable patterns which survive learning and experience.
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