Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62660 
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dc.contributor.authorFainmessery, Itay P.en
dc.contributor.authorGoldberg, David A.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:32:02Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:32:02Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62660-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of repeated games in large buyer-seller networks in the presence of reputation networks via which buyers share information about past transactions. The model allows us to characterize cooperation networks - networks in which each seller cooperates (by providing high quality goods) with every buyer that is connected to her. To this end, we provide conditions under which: [1] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood - a subnetwork that includes seller s and is of a size that is independent of the size of the entire network; and [2] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate can be calculated as if the network was a random tree with seller s at its root. Our characterization sheds light on the welfare costs of relying only on repeated interactions for sustaining cooperation, and on how to mitigate such costs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2011-2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordgraph theoryen
dc.subject.keywordrepeated gamesen
dc.titleBilateral and community enforcement in a networked market with simple strategies-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn655166106en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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