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dc.contributor.authorFainmessery, Itay P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGoldberg, David A.en_US
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of repeated games in large buyer-seller networks in the presence of reputation networks via which buyers share information about past transactions. The model allows us to characterize cooperation networks - networks in which each seller cooperates (by providing high quality goods) with every buyer that is connected to her. To this end, we provide conditions under which: [1] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood - a subnetwork that includes seller s and is of a size that is independent of the size of the entire network; and [2] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate can be calculated as if the network was a random tree with seller s at its root. Our characterization sheds light on the welfare costs of relying only on repeated interactions for sustaining cooperation, and on how to mitigate such costs.en_US
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics |x2011-2en_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordgraph theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordrepeated gamesen_US
dc.titleBilateral and community enforcement in a networked market with simple strategiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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