Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62645
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dc.contributor.authorSautmann, Anjaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:31:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:31:43Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62645-
dc.description.abstractThis paper experimentally tests the predictions of a principal-agent model in which the agent has biased beliefs about his ability. Overconfident workers are found to earn lower wages than underconfident ones because they overestimate their expected payoff, and principals adjust their offers accordingly. Moreover, the profit-maximizing contract distorts effort by varying incentives according to self-confidence, although only the most successful principals use this strategy. These findings have implications for the labor market; in particular, self-confidence is often correlated with gender, implying that principals would prefer to hire men over women simply because they are more overconfident.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics |x2011-10en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleContracts for agents with biased beliefs: Some theory and an experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn661650820en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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