Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62642 
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dc.contributor.authorDe Clippel, Geoffroyen
dc.contributor.authorBejan, Cameliaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:31:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:31:41Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62642-
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally. Hence a traditional welfarist rule emerges as the unique consequence of our axioms phrased in a natural economic environment.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x2009-6en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSocial Choiceen
dc.subject.keywordAxiomatic Bargainingen
dc.subject.keywordWelfarismen
dc.subject.keywordEgalitarianismen
dc.titleNo profitable decomposition in quasi-linear allocation problems-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612934632en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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