Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62642
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dc.contributor.authorDe Clippel, Geoffroyen_US
dc.contributor.authorBejan, Cameliaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T11:31:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-17T11:31:41Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62642-
dc.description.abstractWe study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally. Hence a traditional welfarist rule emerges as the unique consequence of our axioms phrased in a natural economic environment.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aBrown University, Department of Economics |cProvidence, RIen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics |x2009-6en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial Choiceen_US
dc.subject.keywordAxiomatic Bargainingen_US
dc.subject.keywordWelfarismen_US
dc.subject.keywordEgalitarianismen_US
dc.titleNo profitable decomposition in quasi-linear allocation problemsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612934632en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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