Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62640
Authors: 
Kamishiro, Yusuke
Serrano, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2009-12
Abstract: 
We study information transmission in large interim quasilinear economies using the theory of the core. We concentrate on the core with respect to equilibrium blocking, a core notion in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions, as blocking can be understood as an equilibrium of a communication mechanism used by players in coalitions. We consider independent, ex-post and signal-based replicas of the basic economy. For each, we offer an array of negative and positive convergence results as a function of the complexity of the mechanisms used by coalitions. We identify conditions under which asymmetric information remains as an externality and non-market outcomes stay in the core, as well as those for the core to converge to the set of incentive compatible ex-post Walrasian allocations. Further, all the results are robust to the relaxation of the incentive constraints, and hence suggest a process through which information may get incorporated into a fully revealing equilibrium price function.
Subjects: 
Core w.r.t. Equilibrium Blocking
Core Convergence
Independent Replicas
Ex-Post Replicas
Signal-Based Replicas
Information Transmission
Communication Mechanisms
Mediation
Rational Expectations Equilibrium
JEL: 
C71
C72
D51
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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