Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62446 
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dc.contributor.authorGill, Daviden
dc.contributor.authorProwse, Victoria L.en
dc.contributor.authorVlassopoulos, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-01-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-14T11:06:15Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-14T11:06:15Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62446-
dc.description.abstractWe use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme based on random bonuses makes them cheat more but has no effect on their productivity. We also find that more productive workers behave more dishonestly. We explain how these results suggest that workers' cheating behavior responds to the perceived fairness of their employer's compensation scheme.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x6725en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordbonusen
dc.subject.keywordcompensationen
dc.subject.keywordcheatingen
dc.subject.keyworddishonestyen
dc.subject.keywordlyingen
dc.subject.keywordemployee crimeen
dc.subject.keywordproductivityen
dc.subject.keywordslider tasken
dc.subject.keywordreal efforten
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwLeistungsentgelten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsproduktivitäten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsplatzen
dc.subject.stwBetrugen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleCheating in the workplace: An experimental study of the impact of bonuses and productivity-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn720436516en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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