Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62419 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 6815
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have hidden costs, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for reasons specific to group membership. In within-group interactions control has detrimental effects because the agent does not expect to be controlled and reacts negatively when being controlled. In between-group interactions, agents perceive control more hostile once we condition on their beliefs about principal's behavior. Our finding contributes to the micro-foundation of psychological effects of incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
social identity
social preferences
incentives
motivation
crowding out
trust
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
Z13
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
544.14 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.