Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62401
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dc.contributor.authorDal Bó, Ernestoen_US
dc.contributor.authorFinan, Frederico S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRossi, Martín A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-14T11:05:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-14T11:05:25Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/62401-
dc.description.abstractWe study a recent recruitment drive for public sector positions in Mexico. Different salaries were announced randomly across recruitment sites, and job offers were subsequently randomized. Screening relied on exams designed to measure applicants' intellectual ability, personality, and motivation. This allows the first experimental estimates of (i) the role of financial incentives in attracting a larger and more qualified pool of applicants, (ii) the elasticity of the labor supply facing the employer, and (iii) the role of job attributes (distance, attractiveness of the municipal environment) in helping fill vacancies, as well as the role of wages in helping fill positions in less attractive municipalities. A theoretical model guides each stage of the empirical inquiry. We find that higher wages attract more able applicants as measured by their IQ, personality, and proclivity towards public sector work - i.e., we find no evidence of adverse selection effects on motivation; higher wage offers also increased acceptance rates, implying a labor supply elasticity of around 2 and some degree of monopsony power. Distance and worse municipal characteristics strongly decrease acceptance rates but higher wages help bridge the recruitment gap in worse municipalities.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x6645en_US
dc.subject.jelH1en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordstate buildingen_US
dc.subject.keywordstate capabilitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordstate capacityen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic sector personnelen_US
dc.subject.keywordbureaucracyen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic service motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordwagesen_US
dc.subject.keywordelasticity of the labor supplyen_US
dc.subject.keywordpersonalityen_US
dc.subject.stwPersonalbeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Diensten_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten_US
dc.subject.stwPreiselastizitäten_US
dc.subject.stwPersönlichkeitspsychologieen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwMexikoen_US
dc.titleStrengthening state capabilities: The role of financial incentives in the call to public serviceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn718074114en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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