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dc.contributor.authorGarcia-Pires, Armando J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen_US
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Larsen_US
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources and media firms. Although empirically important, this channel for supply-driven media bias has not previously been analyzed in economics literature. We model the relationship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment, where a news source decides if and how much information to provide to a media firm. Strategic interactions between these agents may have a significant impact on the level of media bias in the market. In particular, we show that in some cases the news source provides information if and only if there is competition in the media market, while in other cases competition between media firms reduces the amount of information that is made available to the audience.en_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper: Industrial Organisation |x3906en_US
dc.subject.keywordnews sourcesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmedia biasen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformal contractsen_US
dc.titleNews sources and media biasen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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