Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/62324 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3906
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
In this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources and media firms. Although empirically important, this channel for supply-driven media bias has not previously been analyzed in economics literature. We model the relationship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment, where a news source decides if and how much information to provide to a media firm. Strategic interactions between these agents may have a significant impact on the level of media bias in the market. In particular, we show that in some cases the news source provides information if and only if there is competition in the media market, while in other cases competition between media firms reduces the amount of information that is made available to the audience.
Subjects: 
news sources
media bias
informal contracts
JEL: 
L14
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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