Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62264
Authors: 
Güth, Sandra
Güth, Werner
Müller, Wieland
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,113
Abstract: 
On a homogeneous oligopoly market informed sellers are fully aware of market demand whereas uninformed sellers only know the distribution. We first derive the market results when sellers are risk averse, similarly to Ponssard (1979) who assumed risk neutrality throughout. With the help of these results evolutionary processes are formulated according to which sellers can switch to market research or refrain from it depending on the difference in profits of informed and uninformed sellers. We derive the evolutionarily stable number of informed sellers and discuss how it is influenced by market parameters.
Subjects: 
evolution
oligopoly
market research
private information
JEL: 
C72
D43
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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