Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62255
Authors: 
Lengwiler, Yvan
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,40
Abstract: 
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses.
Subjects: 
auctions
procurement
corruption
collusion
coalitions
JEL: 
D44
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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