Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62206
Authors: 
Huck, Steffen
Müller, Wieland
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,45
Abstract: 
This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test Gilboa's (1997) agent-based approach to games with imperfect recall. We implement his model of the absent-minded driver problem in an experiment and find, if subjects are repeatedly randomly rematched, strong support for the equilibrium prediction which coincides with Piccione and Rubinstein's (1997) ex ante solution of the driver's problem.
Subjects: 
experiments
imperfect recall
the absent-minded driver's paradox
JEL: 
C72
C92
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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