Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62185
Authors: 
Huck, Steffen
Konrad, Kai A.
Müller, Wieland
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,3
Abstract: 
Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.
Subjects: 
contests
merger
JEL: 
D44
L11
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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