Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62163
Authors: 
Dufwenberg, Martin
Gneezy, Uri
Güth, Werner
van Damme, Eric E. C.
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 2000,36
Abstract: 
Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another variation concerns the information about the multiplier of donations where we compare the benchmark case with a commonly known multiplier to a condition where the multiplier is known for sure only by donators. Questions which we try to answer are: Will indirect reciprocity induce higher or lower donations?, will donators with the high multiplier hide behind the small one?, how do receivers respond to the different situations?
Subjects: 
experiment
reciprocity
Trust
game
JEL: 
C72
C92
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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