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Güth, Werner
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SFB 373 Discussion Paper 2000,82
Robust learning experiments confront participants with structurally different decision environments which they encounter, furthermore, repeatedly. Since the decision format does not depend on the rules (of game), forward looking deliberation (the shadow of the future) can be detected by anticipation of rule changes. Adaptation to past success (the shadow of the past) is revealed when playing the same game repeatedly. The experiments of bidding behavior, reputation formation, endogenous timing in negotiations, and alternating offer bargaining allow to draw a few general conclusions.
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Working Paper

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